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Abstract Some authors have demonstrated the value of egalitarian sharing rules in teams,
even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team per-
formance. However, we show the appearance of an undesirable component of rational altruism
when marginal productivities differ across team members and an egalitarian sharing rule is
used. We call this new component of rational altruism the Perverse Element of Rational Altru-
ism (PERA). The presence of the PERA decreases team efﬁciency. In this sense, and considering
several scenarios, an analysis of welfare implications and the evolution of team efﬁciency are
presented.
© 2012 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The ﬂattening of hierarchies and the implementation of team-based forms of work organization have been common practices
among ﬁrms in recent years (Hamilton et al., 2003). The organization of work in teams increases group efﬁciency by taking
advantage of the complementary resources and abilities of team members and also encourages the transfer of codiﬁed
knowledge (Lazear and Shaw, 2007). However, as is well known, team-based organization raises unique motivation problems:
Team production implies that the total output of the group cannot be broken down into the individual contribution of each
of the team members. In addition, team organization generally implies self-management of work and no direct supervision.
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herefore, since neither the individual marginal productivity contribution to the total output, nor the amount or quality of
he effort given by each individual team member can be measured, the team’s compensation has to be tied to the output
f the group as a whole, creating inefﬁciency in the form of free riding and shirking behavior (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
olmström, 1982).
Holmström (1982) formally showed that there is no rule of sharing the joint output among team members that gives
he ﬁrst best welfare maximizing solution and satisﬁes the binding budget constraint at the same time. The lack of such
sharing rule does not preclude the interest in examining the characteristics of second best sharing rules that could
e applied to induce effort in team production. Most existing theoretical studies on optimal motivation in team orga-
izations assume symmetry among team members in the sense of an equal marginal productivity contribution by each
eam member, which could justify why most of the existing work on this topic uses equal sharing rules to explain team
ehavior.
However, there is some debate among scholars as to whether it is appropriate or not to use egalitarian sharing rules when
eam members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance.
Studies of the disadvantages of equal sharing rules are numerous in the literature. For example, Wilson (1968) shows
hat equal sharing cannot be optimal in heterogeneous teams in which team members have different risk tolerances. Farrell
nd Scotchmer (1988) show that equal sharing will lead to inefﬁciently small teams if the team members differ in ability.
herstyuk (1998) not only stated the weaknesses of equal sharing for teams with heterogeneous team members, but also
howed that the equal sharing rule will induce team members with similar abilities to form partnerships thereby preventing
he formation of mixed ability teams. Kräkel and Steiner (2001) show that equal sharing is not optimal, even when team
embers are completely homogeneous, due to the fundamental trade-off between incentives and risk sharing. Finally,
oerg et al. (2010) suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient prerequisite for eliciting high
erformance in teams.
However, in recent years, some authors have again established the convenience of applying egalitarian sharing rules.
peciﬁcally, Bose et al. (2010) demonstrate the value of ‘‘equal pay’’ policies in teams, even when team members have
istinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. Egalitarian sharing rules eliminate the incentive
hat each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce a more favorable reward
tructure. Bartling and Von Siemens (2010) show that with inequity adverse team members, which suffer disutility arising
rom differences between one’s own payoff and others’ payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the equal sharing rule is the only
haring rule that maximizes the team members’ incentive to exert effort.
Our paper elaborates on this current debate and provides new arguments against the application of egalitarian sharing
ules in teams with heterogeneous members. The starting point for this paper is the concept of rational altruism introduced
y Rotemberg (1994) where each team member appears to be altruistic to the other parties even though his/her true interests
re just selﬁsh preferences. Based on this concept, we identify and assess a new and undesirable component of rational
ltruism which could appear when the application of egalitarian sharing rules result in decreases in team efﬁciency. We
eﬁne efﬁciency as the maximization of social welfare (or wealth creation), which corresponds to the sum of the utilities
f the various team members.
Rotemberg (1994) shows that, in the equilibrium of a two stage game, rational altruism implies more effort and greater
ealth creation than could be expected from simple selﬁsh behavior. However, our paper proves that the presence of
ational altruism may not always be beneﬁcial for the fostering of cooperation among team members. We ﬁnd that
hen team member productivity differs, the use of equal sharing rules distorts the way which team members choose
heir degree of ‘‘altruism’’. Speciﬁcally, less productive team members have incentives to simulate altruistic feelings (by
verplaying their level of effort) and increase their parameters of rational altruism, which corresponds to an attempt
o expropriate rents from the more productive team members. As a consequence the more productive team members
ill anticipate this perverse behavior and decrease their degree of altruism and their effort. This induced change in
he rational altruism parameter that is masked under the concept of rational altruism stipulated by Rotemberg (1994)
s called the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). In terms of wealth creation, our results show that the negative
ffect derived from lower levels of effort by the more productive team members is greater than positive effect derived
rom higher levels of effort by the less productive team members. Therefore, the presence of the PERA decreases team
fﬁciency.
At this point, the potential PERA presence should be incorporated into the design of optimal sharing rules that could be
pplied to dilute the undesirable effects of the PERA. Speciﬁcally, this paper shows that the counterproductive effect of the
ERA is not present if team members are paid based on their relative marginal productivities level.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, the paper provides new arguments against the use of egalitarian sharing
ules in teams with heterogeneous members. Second, the paper identiﬁes and measures the perverse effects of a component
f rational altruism not previously identiﬁed in the literature (to the best of our knowledge): the Perverse Element of Rational
ltruism (PERA).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst focus on the design of second-best optimal sharing rules, both
ith and without rational altruism. In the third section, we show the sources of inefﬁciency that appear when using
qual sharing rules in a context of heterogeneous team members and rational altruism. Part of this inefﬁciency is sum-
arized by the concept of the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). In the fourth section, we analyze, considering
everal scenarios, welfare implications and team efﬁciency evolution. Finally, we discuss the main conclusions and implica-
ions.
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2. Second-best optimal sharing rules
The impossibility theorem of Holmström (1982) concerning the non-existence of a sharing rule that gives the ﬁrst best level
of output in a budget constrained team does not preclude the interest in examining the characteristics of second best sharing
rules that could be applied to induce team production effort. Most of the existing theoretical papers on optimal motivation
in team organizations assume symmetry among team members in the sense of the equal marginal productivity contribution
of each team member, which could justify why most of the existing work on this topic uses equal sharing rules to explain
team behavior. This is also the case in Rotemberg’s work where, under the assumption that all members are symmetric in
terms of their marginal productivity contribution to the team output, it is shown that the altruism parameter will also be
the same for all team members (symmetric equilibrium).
However, a hypothesis of symmetric team members can be very unrealistic. Therefore, in this paper we examine the
choice of second best output sharing rules in teams with asymmetric members, and how the choice of these rules is affected
by the rational altruism of team members.
2.1. A proposed optimal sharing rule without rational altruism
We start with a Cobb--Douglas production function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928) with decreasing returns to scale, as this function
is widely accepted in economic literature. The use of a Cobb--Douglas production function is adequate for this study because
it satisﬁes the conditions for ‘‘team production’’ as deﬁned by Alchian and Demsetz (1972); it is capable of handling multiple
inputs (in our study each input corresponds to the resource provided by a team member: ak where k = 1,. . ., N); and it exhibits
strict complementarities among individual efforts. Moreover, it allows us to identify the elasticities (˛k) of the respective
efforts (resources) that each team member (ak) contributes to the team’s output. Precisely, these elasticities will be the
measure of the asymmetry of the team member’s contribution to the team’s output (or contribution-elasticity).
Thus, the Cobb--Douglas production function takes on the following form:
Y = F(a1, ..., aN) = ˇ
N∏
k=1
a˛kk ; 0 < ˛k < 1,
N∑
k=1
˛k < 1 (1)
where Y is the total output from the vector of inputs and the given technology. The parameter ˇ captures the level of total
factor productivity and will be normalized to 1 for simplicity. The parameter ak corresponds to the resource (effort) provided
by team member k. The parameter ˛k measures the elasticity of the output to changes in the quantity of resource provided
by team member k (contribution-elasticity).1 We assume that the elasticity varies across inputs and their values are positive
and less than one.
The resource provided by team member i (ai) has an external market so the opportunity cost of being used in the team
production is given by Ci(ai) =i × ai where ωi is the market price of each unit of input.
Let Si, such that Si > 0 and
∑N
k=1Sk = 1, be the share of total output assigned to team member i. The net utility of team
member i corresponds to the true welfare (in the terminology of Rotemberg (1994) or material payoffs in terminology of
Rabin (1993)). It is deﬁned as Ui = Si ×Y−Ci(ai), which for this particular case of the Cobb--Douglas production function and
linear cost function, is equal to:
Ui = Si ×
(
N∏
k=1
a˛kk
)
− i × ai (2)
Team member i will choose the quantity of input to supply to the joint production by maximizing Ui given in (2). The Nash
equilibrium solution corresponding to the N ﬁrst order conditions of the problems solved by the N members gives a solution
of ai as a function of the vector Si, i = 1 to N; ai (Si, Sj /= i) for i = 1 to N. For the given production and cost functions, the
degree of effort of each team member will be (see Appendix):
a∗i =
(
Si × ˛i
i
)1−∑
j /= i˛j/1−
∑N
k=1˛k∏
j /= i
(
Sj × ˛j
j
)˛j/1−∑Nk=1˛k
(3)
The second best sharing rules are obtained from the solution to the optimization problem:[
N∑ ]Max
Si
F(ai(Si, Sj /= i), aj /= i(Sj /= i, Si /= j)) −
k=1
(k × ak(Sk, Sm /= k)) (4)
constrained to Ri(Y) = (Si ×Y)≥Ci(ai), ∀ iwith
∑N
k=1Sk = 1
1 The ˛ parameters are common knowledge to all team members.
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For the particular production and cost functions and when the participation constraint Ri(Y) = (Si ×Y)≥Ci(ai), ∀ i is non-
inding, the second best sharing rule for team member i, obtained from the solution of this problem, is given by (see
ppendix):
∗
i =
˛i∑N
k=1˛k
(5)
esult 1. The second best sharing rule implies that team members with higher marginal productivities should receive a
arger share of the output than team members with lower marginal productivities. If all team members have the same
arginal productivities, then the second best sharing rule is an egalitarian sharing rule.
.2. A proposed optimal sharing rule with rational altruism
ccording to Rotemberg (1994), team members may have an incentive to show altruistic feelings (rational altruism; RA)
ven though their true interests are merely selﬁsh preferences. Speciﬁcally, the concept of RA assumes that individuals are
ble to choose an optimal degree of altruism before production starts even though they are purely selﬁsh.2 By choosing
ltruism, individuals maximize their payoffs by anticipating how others will best respond to their revealed preferences. As in
otemberg (1994), team members can credibly commit to their rationally chosen altruism even if ex post (the effort exertion
hase) they desire not to act altruistically.
Speciﬁcally, under team production conditions, a selﬁsh team member (i) will show rational altruism toward other team
embers (j /= i) if he/she transmits the conviction to the other team members that his/her utility (URAi ) is:
RA
i = Ui(ai, aj /= i) + i ×
∑
j /= i
(Uj(aj, ai /= j)) (6)
here Ui(ai, aj /= i) represents the utility of team member i according to his/her effort (ai) and that of other team members
aj /= i); Uj(aj,ai /= j) represents the utility of team member j according to his/her effort aj and that of other team members
ai /= j); and parameter i represents how team member i shows that his/her utility is affected by that of team members
/= i.3 Under RA the value of i is chosen strategically by the team members. If the i parameter chosen is zero, then team
ember i behaves as though he/she were selﬁsh; if the i parameter chosen has a value higher than zero, then team member
behaves as though he/she were solidary.
When team member i can enhance his/her material payoffs Ui(ai, aj /= i) by choosing ˆi > 0 instead of ˆi = 0, then param-
ter ˆi represents rational altruism. Consequently, when ˆi > 0 team member i will act toward the rest of team members
s if he/she were solidary, even though he/she is actually selﬁsh.
When efforts are complementary, Rotemberg (1994) shows that rational altruism implies greater effort and greater welfare
han would be expected from simple egoistical behavior. Therefore, rational altruism would bring team outcomes closer to
rst best outcomes compared to a scenario where rational altruism was absent.
In this section, we extend the team production problem to solve for the optimal sharing rule under rational altruism. In
his scenario, in line with Rotemberg (1994, p. 690), once all team members have agreed on sharing rules, we also assume
hat each team member (i) chooses his/her rational altruism parameter (ˆi) maximizing his/her material payoffs -- rational
ltruism subgame. The chosen rational altruism parameters determine individual effort (aRA∗i ) -- effort exertion subgame;
nd both (individual effort and rational altruism parameters) allow us to ﬁnd the optimal sharing rules.
Therefore, we start with the maximization of each team member’s individual utility (URAi ), with a sharing rule based on
eam output (SRAi ) and assuming the presence of rational altruism.
ax
ai
URAi = Max
ai
[
Ui(ai, aj /= i) + i ×
∑
j /= i
[Uj(aj, ai /= j)]
]
= Max
ai
[(
SRAi ×
(
N∏
a˛kk
)
− i × ai
)
+ i ×
∑[
SRAj ×
(
N∏
a˛kk
)
− j × aj
]]
(7)k=1 j /= i k=1
2 We need to assume that team members are purely selﬁsh in order to isolate the rational altruism from other exogenous altruism
omponents.
3 We have to point out that in order to simplify the model we assume that each team member ‘‘feels’’ the same level of altruism (same
ational altruism parameter: i) for all the other team members. Although this assumption could reduce the applicability of the model, it
oes not affect our main objective which is the identiﬁcation of the PERA.
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The solution to this stage shows that the degree of effort of each team member (aRA∗i ) for given values of rational altruism
parameters (i) and given values of sharing rules (SRAi ) is (see Appendix):
ai
RA∗ =
((
SRAi +
(∑
j /= iS
RA
j
)× i)× ˛i
i
)1−∑
j /= i˛j/
∑N
k=1˛k∏
j /= i
((
SRAj +
(∑
i /= jS
RA
i
)× j)× ˛j
j
)˛j/1−∑Nk=1˛k
(8)
Subsequently, each team member calculates the rational altruism value which maximizes his/her material payoffs, given
effort aRA
∗
i (8):
Max
i
Ui = SRAi ×
(
N∏
k=1
(aRA
∗
k )
˛k
)
− i × aRA∗i (9)
The degree of rational altruism shown by each team member (ˆi) is thus (see Appendix):
ˆi =
SRAi ×
∑
j /= i˛j/1 −
∑
j /= i˛j∑
j /= iS
RA
j
(10)
Finally, we derive the problem of ﬁnding the optimal sharing rule Si
RA∗ , maximizing the wealth creation by the team,
taking into account Eqs. (10) and (8):
Max
Si
[
F(aRA∗i (S
RA
i , S
RA
j /= i), a
RA∗
j /= i(S
RA
j /= i, S
RA
i /= j)) −
N∑
k=1
(k × aRA∗k (SRAk , SRAm /= k))
]
(11)
constrained to SRAi × F(aRA∗1 , . . ., aRA∗n )≥Ci(aRA∗i )
with
∑N
k=1S
RA
k = 1
Thus, the optimal sharing rule (SiRA*) is (see Appendix):
SRA∗i = ˛i/
∑N
k=1
˛k (12)
Result 2. The second best sharing rule under rational altruism is the same as that without rational altruism (S∗i = SiRA∗).
Substituting (12) in (10) the equilibrium value of the altruism parameter is
ˆ∗i =
˛i
1 −∑
j /= i˛j
= ˛i
˛i +  (13)
where  = 1 − (∑
k
˛k
)
is the degree of scale diseconomies in the production function.
Result 3. The equilibrium rational altruism parameter is between zero and one. The more productive team members will
show higher rational altruism than less productive ones. The equilibrium rational altruism parameter is lower in production
technologies with higher scale diseconomies.
The ﬁrst part of the result comes from
(
˛i > 0,∀i; and ˛i < 1 −
∑
j /= i˛j ∀i
)
. The second and third parts come from
Eq. (13). This result is in accordance with Rotemberg (1994) which shows that the rational altruism parameter ranges from
0 to 1 (0 < ˆ∗i < 1).
The previous analysis shows how every team member becomes altruistic in his/her own self-interest causing an increase
of his/her effort and, as a consequence, an improvement in the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency.
3. Identiﬁcation and assessment of perverse effects of rational altruism
The main contribution of the present paper is the identiﬁcation and assessment of the perverse effects of rational altruism
which are called the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). The presence of the PERA is clearly detectable when
at least one team member shows a rational altruism parameter higher than one. This generates an adverse value effect on
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ealth creation by the team. Speciﬁcally, from expression (6)4 it can be deduced that the higher the RA parameter is over
ne, the greater the divergence between the team member’s interest and the collective interest.
As noted earlier, when team member abilities are asymmetric, the second best optimal sharing rule assigns a different
roportion of the output to each team member. As a consequence, the more productive team members receive a larger
hare of the output than the less productive ones. However, recent research argues in favor of the beneﬁts of ‘‘equal pay’’
olicies on teams (Bose et al., 2010; Bartling and Von Siemens, 2010). In this section we are interested in examining the
mplications of implementing equal sharing rules, other than the second best optimal one, on rational altruism behavior.
If the egalitarian sharing rule is chosen, (1/N), then the equilibrium expression for the rational altruism parameter (from
xpression (10)) will be:
i
(
SRAi =
1
N
)
=
∑
j /= i˛j/1 −
∑
j /= i˛j
(N − 1) (14)
Positive elasticity of the effort of each of the team members (˛i) and decreasing returns to scale
(
1 −∑
j /= i˛j > 0
)
imply
hat equilibrium altruism parameters will all be positive (ˆi > 0) but different among team members. Moreover, Eq. (14)
mplies that the equilibrium altruism parameter for team member i is independent of his/her contribution-elasticity to the
utput (˛i).
esult 4. Under an egalitarian sharing rule the equilibrium rational altruism parameter of team member i is independent
f his/her contribution-elasticity to the output of the team (˛i). The equilibrium rational altruism parameter of member
increases with the average contribution-elasticity to the output of his/her teammates and decreases with the number of
eam members.
Moreover, it is obvious that ˆ∗i and ˆi will be equal if the team technology is symmetric and each member contributes
qually to the output of the team (˛i =˛j ∀ i, j). It is of interest to examine the distortion in the choice of the rational
ltruism parameter induced by imposing an equal sharing rule, compared with the value of the parameter chosen under the
econd best sharing rule.
PERA
i = ˆi − ˆ∗i =
∑
j /= i˛j/1 −
∑
j /= i˛j
N − 1 −
˛i
1 −∑
j /= i˛j
= 1
N − 1 ×
∑
j /= i˛j[(N − 1) × ˛i]
1 −∑
j /= i˛j
(15)
esult 5. An equal sharing rule implies a rational altruism parameter in equilibrium higher (lower) than the parameter
hosen under the second best sharing rule for those team members with lower (higher) marginal productivities.
We refer to the induced change in the rational altruism parameter from the parameter under the optimal second best
haring rule to the one under the equal sharing rule as the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). The introduction of
n equal sharing rule distorts the rational altruism parameter in such a way that those team members with lower marginal
roductivities now appear to be more altruistic than they were under the second best sharing rule and the opposite occurs
ith the more productive team members.
In Rotemberg (1994), the assumption that all team members are symmetric in terms of contribution-elasticity to team
utput and that the egalitarian sharing rule is the one chosen (1/N) implies that the equilibrium solution will not be affected
y the PERA. In the symmetric case all team members would have the same rational altruism parameters. Therefore, all
eam members would increase their levels of effort equally. Consequently all team members would beneﬁt equally from the
resence of rational altruism.However, when team members are not homogeneous and the egalitarian sharing rule is the one chosen (1/N), the less
roductive team members tend to exaggerate their altruism (positive PERA). These team members try to foster reciprocal
ational altruism feelings from the most productive team members. So, less productive team members would beneﬁt from
he higher marginal productivities of their more productive teammates.
4 Transforming expression (6) and expressing it in an equivalent manner: URA
i
= Ui(ai, aj /= i) + i ×
∑
j /= i
(
Uj(aj, ai /= j)
)
=
If we apply this to our model) =
[
1
N
×
N∏
k=1
a˛k
k
− (i × ai)
]
+ i ×
∑
j /= i
[
1
N
×
N∏
k=1
a˛k
k
−
(
j × aj
)]
= (1 − i) ×
[
1
N
×
N∏
k=1
a˛k
k
− [i × ai]
]
+
i ×
[
N∏
k=1
a˛k
k
−
N∑
k=1
[k × ak]
]
.
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Table 1 Wealth creation.However, the more productive team members anticipate that the less productive team members will increase their
parameters of altruism and, therefore, they tend to decrease their levels of altruism. In terms of wealth creation, the
negative effect derived from lower effort levels of the more productive team members is greater than the positive effect
derived from the higher effort levels of the less productive team members. Therefore, the presence of the PERA decreases
team efﬁciency.
4. Welfare considerations
In this section we examine the changes in total wealth creation of moving from an equal sharing to an optimal second
best sharing rule in heterogeneous teams while also allowing for the possibility of rational altruism of team members. The
situations to be compared are summarized in Table 1 where the rows represent the two different sharing rules and the two
columns differentiate between teams where members practice rational altruism and teams that do not.
All changes in welfare are positive, therefore by deﬁnition moving from an equal sharing rule to a second best sharing
rule increases total wealth creation [relations (1*) and (2*)]. Also, rational altruism improves wealth creation in teams that
apply equal sharing rules and in teams that apply second best sharing rules since rational altruism parameters for all team
members are always positive [relations (3*) and (4*)].
In the case of no altruism and asymmetric teams, the use of egalitarian sharing rules (or moving away from the second
best sharing rule) decreases team efﬁciency with respect to the second best sharing rule by lowering the effort levels of
the most productive team members relative to the levels under the second best sharing rule. When the sharing rule gives
a larger part of the output to the more productive members (using the second best sharing rule) they increase their efforts
and team efﬁciency is improved even though less productive team members decrease their effort levels.
If the team members engage in some form of rational altruism, then the equal sharing rule also distorts the equilibrium
altruism parameters such that less productive team members tend to over play their altruism at the expense of the more
productive ones. When the sharing rule gives a larger part of the output to the more productive members then the gain
through rational altruism by the less productive team members is lower and so they refrain from showing their PERA levels,
increasing RA levels of the most productive team members and thereby improving team efﬁciency.
We are interested in examining when the increases in welfare are higher. We conjecture that the opportunity cost, in
terms of lost welfare, of implementing equal sharing rules in asymmetric teams is higher when the members of the team
engage in some form of rational altruism.
Speciﬁcally, when the team is composed of two members (N = 2), the following relationship holds for wealth creation by
the two team members (see Appendix) in the four situations shown in Table 1 (see Appendix):
WC∗S1=S∗1=˛1/˛1+˛2; S2=S∗2=˛2/˛1+˛2
WC∗S1=S2=1/2
=
WC∗RAS1=S∗1=˛1/˛1+˛2; S2=S∗2=˛2/˛1+˛2
WC∗RAS1=S2=1/2
(16)
From expression (16) and taking into account the results shown in Table 1 (WC∗RAS1=S2=1/2 > WC
∗
S1=S2=1/2;
WC∗RAS =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ ; S =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ > WC
∗
S =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ ; S =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ and WC
∗
S =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ ;S =S∗=˛ /˛ +˛ > WC
∗
S =S =1/2) we obtain that1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
(WC∗RAS1=S∗1=˛1/˛1+˛2; S2=S∗2=˛2/˛1+˛2
− WC∗RAS1=S2=1/2) > (WC∗S1=S∗1=˛1/˛1+˛2; S2=S∗2=˛2/˛1+˛2 − WC
∗
S1=S2=1/2). Therefore, we can conclude
that the application of second best sharing rules improves wealth creation more than the application of equal sharing
rules, and with rational altruism more than without rational altruism.
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This means that the relative gain in welfare of going from equal sharing to second best sharing rules is the same with
ational altruism as without altruism. Since the initial welfare base is lower in the case of no altruism, the absolute increase
n welfare must be higher when the shift from equal to second best sharing rules occurs in teams with rational altruism. In
ther words, the opportunity cost, in terms of lost welfare, of implementing equal sharing rules in heterogeneous teams is
igher when the members of the team engage in some form of rational altruism. The PERA probably explains this result.
eparting from the second best sharing rule in these teams creates an additional distortion of team member behavior such
hat those with low contribution-elasticity to the team’s output overplay their altruism in the hope of increasing the effort
f the more productive team members and thereby obtaining additional beneﬁts thanks to the equal sharing rule. When the
haring rule gives a larger part of the output to the more productive members then the gain from rational altruism by the
ess productive team members is lower and so they refrain from showing their PERA levels. These conclusions are symmetric
o we can argue that introducing rational altruism in a team that initially does not practice it will provide a larger increase
n total wealth creation when the team uses second best sharing rules than when it uses equal sharing rules.
. Concluding remarks
here is currently no consensus on the appropriateness of using egalitarian sharing rules. Specialized literature gives argu-
ents both in favor of, and against, the use of this rule in different scenarios. Therefore, our paper elaborates on this
urrent debate and provides new arguments against the application of the egalitarian sharing rules when team members
ave different marginal productivities.
Speciﬁcally, when team members display some form of rational altruism (Rotemberg, 1994), we ﬁnd that the egalitarian
haring rule modiﬁes the rational altruism parameter of team members compared to the parameter chosen in the case of
he second best sharing rule (the sharing rule based on relative marginal productivities). In this paper this distortion of the
ational altruism parameter is called the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). It means that, under equal sharing
ules and heterogeneous team members, the less productive team members tend to exaggerate their altruism with the
xpectation of inducing increased effort from the more productive team members and beneﬁting from it. On the contrary,
he more productive team members anticipate that the less productive ones will increase their parameters of altruism and,
herefore, they tend to reduce their altruism. In this scenario rational altruism continues to improve wealth creation in
eams with equal sharing rules, compared to the wealth creation in a no altruism scenario, but to a lesser degree than
t would under second best sharing rules. Moreover, the opportunity cost, in terms of lost welfare, of implementing equal
haring rules in heterogeneous teams is higher in teams that engage in rational altruism than in teams that do not.
All these conclusions lose relevance in homogeneous teams since in this case the second best sharing rule is the egalitarian
ne, so all potential distortions disappear. If the recommendation of forming homogeneous teams holds whenever there are
estrictions to applying sharing rules other than the egalitarian sharing rule, it is even more applicable in cases where team
embers can be expected to show some form of rational altruism.
The paper could be extended to other production functions different from the Cobb--Douglas one but we expect that the
ualitative conclusions of our results would be the same. Another important line of future research would be to identify the
xistence of the PERA in experiments; rational altruism is difﬁcult to isolate in empirical observation of behavior so we are
naware of how important it can be in actual team production activities. Controlled experiments should help to isolate this
ehavior as well as the effect of modifying the sharing rules with and without rational altruism.
ppendix.
.1. Demonstration Eq. (3)
q. (2) is:
i = Si
(
N∏
k=1
˛˛kk
)
− ωi˛i
ith two team members:
u1 = S1a˛1a˛2 − ω1a11 2
u2 = S2a˛12 a˛22 − ω2a2
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A.2. Demonstration of Eq. 5
Eq. (4) is:
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i = ˛i∑N
k=1˛k
.3. Demonstration of Eq. (8)
q. (7) is:
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A.4. Demonstration of Eq. (10)
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A.6. Demonstration of Eq. (16)
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⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦× 1N ×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(
1
N∑ )
⎛
⎜⎜ N∑
⎡
⎢⎢ ˛2
k
⎤
⎥⎥
⎞
⎟⎟
⎛
⎜⎜ N∑
⎡
⎢⎢ ˛2
k
⎤
⎥⎥
1
N∑
⎞
⎟⎟1 −
N
×
k=1
˛k −⎜⎜⎝ k=1 ⎢⎢⎣( N∑
k=1
˛k
)
×
(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)⎥⎥⎦⎟⎟⎠+⎜⎜⎝ k=1 ⎢⎢⎣( N∑
k=1
˛k
)
×
(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)⎥⎥⎦× N × k=1 ˛k⎟⎟⎠
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=
1 −
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N ×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦×
N∑
k=1
˛k
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N∑
k=1
˛k
×
N∑
k=1
[
˛2k
]× N
N
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N∑
k=1
˛k
×
N∑
k=1
[
˛2k
]× 1
N
×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1 −
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N ×
N∑
k=1
˛k ×
N∑
k=1
˛k
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N∑
k=1
˛k
×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦× NN
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1N∑
k=1
˛k
×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦× 1N ×
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
N×
N∑
k=1
˛k−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦×
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎠−
(
N∑
k=1
[˛2k]×N
)
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
[˛2k]×
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
N×
N∑
k=1
˛k
N×
N∑
k=1
˛k−
(
N∑
k=1
˛k×
N∑
k=1
˛k
)
−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦×N
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦×
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
N×
N∑
k=1
˛k
=
N ×
N∑
k=1
˛k −
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦×
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎠−
(
N∑
k=1
[
˛2k
]× N
)
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
[
˛2k
]× N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ ˛k
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
N ×
N∑
k=1
˛k −
(
N∑
k=1
˛k ×
N∑
k=1
˛k
)
−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦× N
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
k=1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
˛2
k(
1−
∑
j /= k
˛j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦×
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
If N = 2 then
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
WC∗
S∗
i
= ˛i
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
×
(
WC∗RA
Si= 1N
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎟⎟⎟ ( )
=
(
WC∗RA
S1=S2= 12
)
×
(
WC∗
S∗1=
˛1
˛1+˛2 ; S
∗
2
= ˛2˛1+˛2
)
(
WC∗RA
S∗1=
˛1
˛1+˛2 ; S
∗
2
= ˛2˛1+˛2
)
×
(
WC∗
S1=S2= 12
)
⎜⎜⎜⎝
WC∗RA
S∗
i
= ˛i
N∑
k=1
˛k
⎟⎟⎟⎠
× WC∗
Si= 1N
4=
=
=
R
A
B
B
C
F
F
G
H
H
K
L
R
R
S
W6 J. García-Bernal, M. Ramírez-Alesón
2 × (˛1 + ˛2) − (˛1 + ˛2) ×
(
˛1
1−˛2 +
˛2
1−˛1
)
− 2 × (˛21 + ˛22)+ (˛21 + ˛22)× ( ˛11−˛2 + ˛21−˛1
)
2 × (˛1 + ˛2) − (˛1 + ˛2)2 − 2 ×
(
˛21
1−˛2 +
˛2
2
1−˛1
)
+ (˛1 + ˛2) ×
(
˛21
1−˛2 +
˛2
2
1−˛1
)
2 × (˛1 + ˛2) × (1 − ˛1) × (1 − ˛2) − (˛1 + ˛2) × [˛1 × (1 − ˛1) + ˛2 × (1 − ˛2)] − 2 ×
(
˛21 + ˛22
)
× (1 − ˛1) × (1 − ˛2) +
(
˛21 + ˛22
)× [˛1 × (1 − ˛1) + ˛2 × (1 − ˛2)]
2 × (˛1 + ˛2) × (1 − ˛1) × (1 − ˛2) − (˛1 + ˛2)2 × (1 − ˛1) × (1 − ˛2) − 2
× [˛21 × (1 − ˛1) + ˛22 × (1 − ˛2)]+ (˛1 + ˛2) × [˛21 × (1 − ˛1) + ˛22 × (1 − ˛2)]
−˛41 − ˛42 − 2 × ˛31 × ˛2 − 2 × ˛32 × ˛1 + 4 × ˛31 + 4 × ˛32 + 6 × ˛21 × ˛2 + 6 × ˛22 × ˛1 − 2 × ˛21 × ˛22
−5 × ˛21 − 5 × ˛22 − 6 × ˛1 × ˛2 + 2 × ˛1 + 2 × ˛2
−˛41 − ˛42 − 2 × ˛31 × ˛2 − 2 × ˛32 × ˛1 + 4 × ˛31 + 4 × ˛32 + 6 × ˛21 × ˛2 + 6 × ˛22 × ˛1
−2 × ˛21 × ˛22 − 5 × ˛21 − 5 × ˛22 − 6 × ˛1 × ˛2 + 2 × ˛1 + 2 × ˛2
= 1
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